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A Pollution Control Problem for the Aluminum
Production in Eastern Siberia: Differential
Game Approach∗
Ekaterina V. Gromova, Anna V. Tur and Polina I. Barsuk
Abstract In this paper, we apply a dynamic game-theoretic model and analyze the
problem of pollution control in Eastern Siberia region of Russia. When carrying out
the analysis we use real numerical values of parameters. It is shown that cooperation
between the major pollutants can be beneficial not only for the nature but also for
the respective companies.
1 Introduction
Air pollution is a major environmental problem that affects everyone in the civilized
world. Emissions from large industrial enterprises have a great adverse impact on
the environment and the people’s quality of life.
A detailed review of the scientific literature published in 1990–2015 on the topic
of climate and environmental changes can be found in [4]. Air pollution is closely
linked to climate change. Therefore, one of the most important issues in ecologic
management concerns the reduction of the pollutant emission into the atmosphere.
Game theory offers a powerful tool for modeling and analyzing situations where
multiple players pursue different but not necessarily opposite goals. In particular, it
is well suited for analyzing the ecological management problems in which players
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(countries, plants) produce some goods while bearing costs due to the emitted pol-
lution [5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 15]. It should be noted that most results on pollution control
turn out to be of more theoretical nature because it is difficult to obtain realistic
numerical values of the model parameters.
In contrast to the mentioned approach we consider local situations that can be
modeled with more precision. Furthermore, we hope that the obtained results can be
of use when planning local policies aimed at decreasing pollution load in particular
regions. Recently, there has been a paper devoted to the pollution control problem of
the city Bratsk from the Irkutsk region of the Russian Federation based on data for
2011, [16]. Our contribution extends the model presented in the mentioned paper,
moreover, the ecological situation is considered for the largest alumn enterprises
of Eastern Siberia located in Krasnoyarsk, Bratsk, and Shelekhov that the largest
plants which produce about 70% of aluminum in Russia has been built. In the model
we include an absorbtion which is considered for different weather conditions. It
is known that the ecological situation aggravates in the wintertime on account of
the frequent temperature inversions, weak winds, and fog [1, 2, 3]. The problem of
pollution control is formulatedwith a differential game framework and is considered
based on data for 2016 [24, 25].
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the description of the differential
game model is presented. In section 2.1, a non-cooperative solution is found, the
Nash equilibrium is considered as an optimality principal. Section 2.2 deals with
cooperative differential game. The numerical example of pollution control for the
aluminum production in Eastern Siberia is presented in the section 3.
2 A Game-Theoretic Model
Consider a game-theoretic model of pollution control based on the models [5, 8].
It is assumed that on the territory of a given region there are n stationary sources
of air pollution involved in the game. Each player has an industrial production site.
Let the production of each unit is proportional to its pollution ui. Thus, the strategy
of a player is to choose the amount of pollution emitted to the atmosphere. We
assume that the n sources ”contribute” to the same stock of pollution. Denote the
stock of accumulated net emissions by x(t). The dynamics of the stock is given by
the following equation with initial condition:
x˙(t) =
n
∑
i=1
ui(t)− δx(t), t ∈ [t0,T ], x(t0) = x0, (1)
where δ denotes the environment’s self-cleaning capacity. Each player i controls its
emission ui ∈ [0,bi], bi > 0, i = 1,n. The solution will be considered in the class of
open-loop strategies ui(t).
The net revenue of player i at time instant t is given by quadratic functional
form: Ri(ui(t)) = ui(t)
(
bi−
1
2
ui(t)
)
, t ∈ [t0,T ], where bi > 0. Each player i bears
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pollution costs defined as dix(t), where di ≥ 0 is a fine for environmental pollution.
The revenue of player i at time instant t Ri(ui(t))− dix(t). The objective of player i
is to maximize its payoff
Ki (x0,T − t0,u1,u2, . . . ,un) =
∫
T
t0
(
Ri(ui)− dix(s)
)
ds. (2)
2.1 Nash Equilibrium
We choose the Nash equilibrium as the principle of optimality in non-cooperaive
game. To find the optimal emissions uNE1 , . . . ,u
NE
n for players 1, . . . ,n, we apply
Pontrygin’s maximum principle. The Hamiltonian for this problem is as follows:
Hi(x0,T − t0,u,ψ) = ui(t)
(
bi−
1
2
ui(t)
)
− dix(t)+ψi
(
n
∑
i=1
ui(t)− δx(t)
)
. (3)
From the first-order optimality condition we get the following formulas for optimal
controls: uNE
i
= bi +ψi, i = 1, . . . ,n. Adjoint variables ψi(t) can be found from
differential equations
∂Hi(x0,T−t0,u,ψ)
∂x =−
dψi(t)
dt
, ψi(T ) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,n. Then
u
NE
i (t) = bi−
di
δ
+
di
δ
e
δ (t−T )
, i = 1, . . . ,n. (4)
Here we assume that for the environment’s self-cleaning capacity δ the following
inequalities hold: δ ≥ di
bi
, i= 1, . . . ,n. This condition ensures that ui ∈ [0,bi], i= 1,n.
Let bN =
n
∑
i=1
bi, dN =
n
∑
i=1
di. Then the optimal trajectory is:
x
NE(t) =C1e
−δ t +
dN
2δ 2
e
δ (t−T )+
bN
δ
−
dN
δ 2
, (5)
where C1 = e
δ t0(x0−
bN
δ +
dN
δ 2
− dN
2δ 2
e
δ (t0−T )).
But in the case when for some i: δ < di
bi
, it may happens that optimal control uNE
i
for player i leaves the compact [0;bi]. Let ti = T +
1
δ ln(1−
biδ
di
). If δ < di
bi
and ti > t0
then optimal control for player i has a following form:
u
NE
i (t) =
{
0, for t0 ≤ t ≤ t i;
bi−
di
δ +
di
δ e
δ (t−T ), for t i ≤ t ≤ T.
(6)
It can be noted that T + 1δ ln(1−
biδ
di
)≥ T − bi
di
for all δ > 0. It means if T ≤ t0+
bi
di
,
then optimal controls have no switching points.
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2.2 Cooperative Solution
Consider now the cooperative case of the game. Assume the players agreed to co-
operate and their goal is to achieve the joint optimum. The joint payoff is:
n
∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0,u1,u2, . . . ,un) =
∫
T
t0
( n
∑
i=1
Ri(ui)− dNx(s)
)
ds. (7)
Similarly to non-cooperative case we apply Pontrygin’s maximum principle and
obtain:
u
∗
i (t) = bi−
dN
δ
+
dN
δ
e
δ (t−T )
, i = 1, . . . ,n. (8)
Here we assume that for the environment’s self-cleaning capacity δ the following
inequalities hold: δ ≥ dN
bi
, i = 1, . . . ,n. This condition ensures that u∗
i
∈ [0,bi], i =
1,n. Then the optimal cooperative trajectory is:
x
∗(t) =C2e
−δ t +
ndN
2δ 2
e
δ (t−T )+
bN
δ
−
ndN
δ 2
, (9)
where C2 = e
δ t0(x0−
bN
δ +
ndN
δ 2
− ndN
2δ 2
e
δ (t0−T )).
Notice that the open loop Nash equilibrium yields more pollution than the opti-
mal strategies in the cooperative game:
n
∑
i=1
u
∗
i
(T ) =
n
∑
i=1
u
NE
i
(T ), and for all t ∈ [t0;T ):
n
∑
i=1
u
∗
i (t)−
n
∑
i=1
u
NE
i (t) =
dN(n− 1)
δ
(eδ (t−T )− 1)< 0.
Also consider the situation, when for player i the inequality δ < dN
bi
holds. In this
case u∗
i
(t) becomes negative when t < t˜, where t˜i = T +
1
δ ln(1−
biδ
dN
). So, if δ < dN
bi
and t˜i > t0, then optimal control for player i has a following form:
u
∗
i (t) =
{
0, for t0 ≤ t ≤ t˜i;
bi−
dN
δ +
dN
δ e
δ (t−T )
, for t˜i ≤ t ≤ T.
(10)
It can be noted that T + 1δ ln(1−
biδ
dN
)≥ T − bi
dN
for all δ > 0. It means if T ≤ t0+
bi
dN
,
then optimal cooperative control of player i has no switching points.
3 A Pollution Control Problem in Eastern Siberia
Non-ferrous metallurgy is one of the most developed industries in Eastern Siberia.
Large aluminum smelters such as Krasnoyarsk, Bratsk and Irkutsk AluminumPlants
are located in this region. All of the above-mentioned factories belong to the United
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CompanyRUSAL, which is one of the world’s major producers of aluminium. In the
model under consideration, the problem of reducing emissions from smelters during
adverse weather conditions can be solved by changing the parameter δ denoted the
environment’s self-cleaning capacity.
We consider the 3-players differential game, where players are the specified com-
panies. To calculate the required model parameters bi, di, we use the data about the
sources of air pollution for year 2016. Let the coefficient bi ≥ 0 equals to a ratio of
operating profit of company (Pi) to its amount of air emissions (Vi). Furthermore,
di ≥ 0 determines the amount of fine for air pollution depending on the total pol-
lution. To determine the fines, we used the data about companies payments for air
pollution in the year 2016. Let Li be the payment for air pollution of the company i,
then:
bi =
Pi
Vi
, di =
Li
V1+V2+V3
. (11)
Table 1 includes the data corresponding to 2016 on the operating profit of each
company, its air pollution and payments for air pollution. The operating profit of
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter could be found in [19]. [18] gives us the joint op-
erating profit of Bratsk and Irkutsk Aluminum Smelters, which is equal to 4210,43
million rubles. We estimated the profit of each company in proportion to the vol-
ume of aluminum produced by these companies in 2016. According to [20], Bratsk
Aluminum Smelter produced 1005500 tons of aluminum and Irkutsk Aluminum
Smelter – 415400 tons in 2016. So, the operating profit of the two plants accounts
for 2979,51 million rubles and 1230,92 million rubles respectively. The payment
for air pollution of Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter amounted to L1 = 87723,95
thousands rubles [21] in 2016. According to [23] the payment for air pollution of
the company Irkutsk Aluminum Smelter accounted for L2 = 18830 thousands rubles
in the same year. Environmental impact fee including waste disposal fee of Bratsk
Aluminum Smelter is equals to 65278 in 2016 [23]. According to [22] the pay-
ment for air pollution of Bratsk Aluminum Smelter is approximately 90 percent of
its total environmental impact fee. So, we estimated its payment for air pollution
at L2 = 0,9 · 65278 = 58780,2 thousands rubles. Using formulas (11) we get the
respective coefficients of the model bi, di (Table 1).
Table 1 The operating profits, air pollutions and payments for air pollution of the companies in
2016. The coefficients of the model
Company Pi (mln. rubles) Vi (tons) Li (ths. rubles) bi di
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter 3412,23 57800 87723,95 59035,12 525,06
Bratsk Aluminum Smelter 2979,51 83578,707 58780,2 35649,15 351,64
Irkutsk Aluminum Smelter 1230,92 25694,1 18830 47906,72 112,71
Table 2 represents the non-cooperative solutions obtained for some numerical
parameters (t0 = 0, T = 0,4). We consider two cases of meteorological conditions,
more precisely, value δ = 0,02 corresponds to adverse weather conditions, for in-
stance, in winter months and δ = 0,2 to normal weather conditions. The inequalities
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T ≤ t0+
bi
di
, T ≤ t0+
bi
dN
are satisfied for the chosen parameter values, thus, optimal
cooperative controls of players have no switching points (we use (4), (8) to compute
the optimal strategies). Table 3 contains the optimal cooperative strategies.
Table 2 Nash equilibrium strategies. Payoffs of companies in Nash equilibrium
Company uNE
i
, δ = 0,02 uNE
i
, δ = 0,2
KrAS 32782,12+26253e0,02t−0,008 56409,82+2625,3e0,2t−0,08
BrAS 18067,15+17582e0,02t−0,008 33890,95+1758,2e0,2t−0,08
IrAS 42271,22+5635,5e0,02t−0,008 47343,17+563,55e0,2t−0,08
Ki
(
x0,T − t0,u
NE
)
, δ = 0,02 Ki
(
x0,T − t0,u
NE
)
, δ = 0,2
KrAS 691063605,8−209,19x0 691203820−201,84x0
BrAS 250177865,6−140,09x0 250271735−135,18x0
IrAS 457730701,9−44,9x0 457760774,5−43,33x0
Table 3 Optimal cooperative strategies
Company u∗
i
, δ = 0,02 u∗
i
, δ = 0,2
KrAS 9564,62+49470,5e0,02t−0,008 54088,07+4947,05e0,2t−0,08
BrAS −13821,35+49470,5e0,02t−0,008 30702,1+4947,05e0,2t−0,08
IrAS −1563,78+49470,5e0,02t−0,008 42959,67+4947,0e0,2t−0,08
If we compare cooperative and non-cooperative emissions of players from Table
2 and 3 it is easy to show that the optimal cooperative emissions are less. Table
4 shows differences between total air pollution in cooperative and non-cooperative
cases and differences between the accumulated emissions. The joint cooperative
payoffs and its differences with sum of payoffs in Nash equilibrium are also given
in the Table 4.
Table 4 Differences between total air pollution in cooperative and non-cooperative case and dif-
ferences between the accumulated emissions. Joint cooperative payoff
δ
n
∑
i=1
u
NE
i
(t)−
n
∑
i=1
u
∗
i
(t) xNE (T )−x∗(T )
n
∑
i=1
Ki (x0,T − t0,u
∗)
n
∑
i=1
Ki (u
∗)−
n
∑
i=1
Ki
(
u
NE
)
δ = 0,02 98941(1− e0,02t−0,008) 157,044 1398986922−394,18x0 14748,7
δ = 0,2 9894,1(1− e0,2t−0,08) 146,2124 1399250309−380,35x0 13979,5
Consider the Shapley value as an cooperative solution. To calculate it we use
a non-standard method of construction a characteristic function proposed in [9].
According to [9] players from coalition S use (obtained earlier) strategies u∗
S
from
the optimal profile u∗ and the players from N \ S use (obtained earlier) strategies
u
NE
N\S from the Nash equilibrium strategies:
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V
η(S, ·) =

0, S = { /0},
∑
i∈S
Ki(·,u
∗
S
,uNE
N\S), S ⊂ N,
max
u1,...,un
n
∑
i=1
Ki(·,u1, . . . ,un), S = N.
(12)
Table 5 contains the characteristic function for our example. The Shapley values are
presented in Table 6. It is also interesting to see how much each firm benefits from
cooperation as compared to a non-cooperative case. Table 6 shows this difference.
We can observe that it is profitable to the companies to stick to the cooperative
agreement, however to different extent.
Table 5 Characteristic function
δ = 0,02 δ = 0,2
V
η ({1},x0,T − t0) 691061320,2−209,19x0 691201653,2−201,84x0
V
η ({2},x0,T − t0) 250173553−140,09x0 250267647,2−135,18x0
V
η ({3},x0,T − t0) 457722552,2−44,9x0 457753050−43,33x0
V
η ({1,2},x0,T − t0) 941245436,6−349,28x0 941479313,4−337,02x0
V
η ({1,3},x0,T − t0) 1148794743−254,09x0 1148965007−245,17x0
V
η ({2,3},x0,T − t0) 707904167−184,99x0 708028338−178,5x0
Table 6 Shapley value. Difference between the Shapley value and the Nash equilibrium
Company Shi(x0,T − t0) Shi(x0,T − t0) Shi −Ki
(
u
NE
)
Shi −Ki
(
u
NE
)
δ = 0,02 δ = 0,2 δ = 0,02 δ = 0,2
KrAS 691072037,4−209,19x0 691211811,9−201,84x0 8431,6 7991,9
BrAS 250182865,8−140,09x0 250276474,5−135,18x0 5000,2 4739,5
IrAS 457732018,6−44,9x0 457762022,7−43,33x0 1316,7 1248,2
The results show that cooperation is beneficial for all smelters. It should be noted
that the higher value of the fine di, the more profitable the company is to cooperate.
In our example Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelter is most motivated for cooperation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we applied game theory to analyze the problem of pollution control
in Eastern Siberia. In doing so, we considered the real data for 2016-2018 years ob-
tained from statistical and accounting reports. It can be noted that for small values
of the absorbtion parameter δ , when unfavorable weather conditions occur, players
are more motivated for cooperation. We also observe a greater decrease of accumu-
lated emissions under cooperation during adverse weather conditions. This shows
that the model, which takes into account a self-cleaning ability of the atmosphere,
allows more effective influence on companies to reduce emissions during adverse
weather conditions.
8 Ekaterina V. Gromova, Anna V. Tur and Polina I. Barsuk
References
1. Akhtimankina, A. V.: Investigation of Dynamics of Concentration of Harmful Substances
in Atmosphere of Shelekhov City. The bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series ”Earth
Sciences” 13, 42–57 (2015) (in Russian)
2. Arguchintseva, A.V., Kochugova, E.A.: Atmospheric Self-Purification Potential. The bul-
letin of Irkutsk State University. Series ”Earth Sciences” 27, (2019) doi: 10.26516/2073-
3402.2019.27.3 (in Russian)
3. Avdeeva, E.V., Chernikova, K.V.: The features of formation of the environment of a large
industrial city (on the example of Krasnoyarsk). Theoretical and Applied Research Journal -
Conifers of the boreal area 29(3-4), 183–188 (2011) (in Russian)
4. Edvardsson Bjo¨rnberg, K., Karlsson, M., Gilek, M., Hansson, S.O.: Climate and environmen-
tal science denial: A review of the scientific literature published in 1990-2015. J. of Cleaner
Production 167, 229–241 (2017)
5. Breton, M., Zaccour, G., Zahaf, M.: A differential game of joint implementation of environ-
mental projects. Automatica 41(10), 1737–1749, (2005)
6. Dockner, E.J., Van Long, N.: International pollution control: cooperative versus noncoopera-
tive strategies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25.1, 13–29 (1993)
7. Dockner, E.J., Jorgensen, S., Van Long, N., Sorger, G.: Differential games in economics and
management science. Cambridge University Press (2000)
8. Gromova, E.: The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games
of Three Players. In: Petrosyan, L.A., Mazalov, V.V. (Eds.) Recent Advances in Game Theory
and Applications, Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, pp. 67–
91. Springer (2016)
9. Gromova, E.V., Marova, E.V.: Coalition and Anti-coalition Interaction in Cooperative Differ-
ential Games. IFAC PapersOnLine 51(32) 479–483 (2018) doi: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2018.11.466
10. Jorgensen, S., Quincampoix, M., Vincent, T.L. (eds.): Advances in Dynamic Game Theory:
Numerical methods, algorithms, and applications to ecology and economics. Springer (2007)
11. Van Long, N.:. Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey. Dynamic
Games and Applications 1(1), 115–148 (2011)
12. Van Long, N.: Pollution control: A differential game approach. Annals of Operations Re-
search 37, 283–296 (1992)
13. Ma¨ler, K.G., De Zeeuw, A.: The acid rain differential game. Environmental and Resource
Economics 12(2), 167–184 (1998)
14. Petrosjan, L., Zaccour, G.: Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduc-
tion. Journal of economic dynamics and control 27(3), 381–398 (2003)
15. Van der Ploeg, F., de Zeeuw, A.: A differential game of international pollution control. Sys-
tems & control letters 17(6), 409–414 (1991)
16. Tur, A.V., Gromova, E.V.: On Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions: An Example of the
Largest Industrial Enterprises of Irkutsk Oblast. Autom Remote Control 81, 548– 565 (2020)
17. Vikulova, A.A.: Game-theoretic approach to the problem of regulating the volume of harmful
emissions of industrial enterprises in the Irkutsk region. Master thesis. SPbSU (2019).
18. Accounting report of JSC ”RUSAL Bratsk”, https://braz-rusal.ru/ , 2016 (in Rus-
sian)
19. Accounting report of JSC ”RUSAL Krasoyarsky aluminum smelter” 2016
https://e-ecolog.ru/buh/2016/2465000141 (in Russian)
20. Yearly report of JSC ”RUSAL Bratsk” 2016 (https://braz-rusal.ru/) (in Russian)
21. http://gkeco-nn.ru/images/docs/DRPN_Presentation.pdf
22. State reports ”About the state and protection of the environment in Irkutsk oblast” in 2011,
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 https://irkobl.ru/sites/ecology/picture/ (in Rus-
sian)
23. State report ”About the state and protection of the environment in Irkutsk oblast in 2016”,
https://irkobl.ru/sites/ecology/picture/ (in Russian)
Differential Game of Pollution Control for the Aluminum Production in Eastern Siberia 9
24. State report ”About the state and protection of the environment in Russian Federation in
2016”, http://www.mnr.gov.ru/docs/gosudarstvennye_doklady/ (in Rus-
sian)
25. State reports ”About the state and protection of the environment in Russian Federation” in
2017, 2018 http://www.mnr.gov.ru/docs/gosudarstvennye_doklady/ (in
Russian)
